In the Privacy of Our Streets by Véliz, Carissa
	 1 
Véliz, Carissa. 2018. "In the Privacy of Our Streets." In Surveillance, Privacy, and Public 
Space, edited by Bryce C. Newell, Tjerk Timan and Bert-Jaap Koops, 16-32. London: 
Routledge. 
 
 
In the Privacy of Our Streets 
 
Carissa Véliz 
University of Oxford 
 
 
Introduction 
 
If one lives in a city and wants to be by oneself or have a private conversation with 
someone else, there are two ways to set about it: either one finds a place of solitude, 
such as one’s bedroom, or one finds a place crowded enough, public enough, that 
attention to each person dilutes so much so as to resemble a deserted refuge. Often, 
one can get more privacy in public places than in the most private of spaces. The 
home is not always the ideal place to find privacy. Neighbours snoop, children ask 
questions, and family members judge. When the home suffocates privacy, the only 
escape is to go out, to the coffee shop, the public square. For centuries, city streets 
have been the true refuges of the solitaries, the overwhelmed, and the underprivileged.   
 
Yet time and again we hear people arguing that we do not have any claim to privacy 
while on the streets because they are part of the so-called public sphere. The main 
objective of this chapter is to argue that privacy belongs as much in the streets as it 
does in the home. 
 
In the first section, I argue that the distinction between the private and the public 
sphere does not map onto what should be guarded by privacy. In other words, we 
cannot figure out what ought to be protected by privacy by referring to the 
private/public distinction. In the second section, I argue that privacy can only be 
safeguarded by protecting both our personal information and our autotopos—a 
metaphorical sensorial personal space or privacy bubble—and offer a few reflection 
on the value of privacy.1 The third section is about the streets of a city as a vital 
commons, the importance of privacy to ensure their full enjoyment by all citizens, and 
the threats that are eroding privacy in public spaces. The fourth section concludes the 
chapter with a final defence for privacy in the streets. 
 
The street and the public sphere 
 
Because of the close etymology between the noun privacy and the adjective private, it is 
understandable to assume that privacy will always be on the ‘private’ side in the 
dichotomy between the private and the public. Whether this is true depends on how 
we divide and conceptualize the distinction. When it comes to streets and public 
squares, we seem to think these belong to the public sphere on account of two 
common ways of dividing the public from the private: on the basis of physical spaces 
and on the basis of funding. As I shall argue, on these ways of separating the public 																																																								
1 Some parts of Sections I-II have been taken from my dissertation. 
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from the private, it is untrue that what ought to enjoy privacy always belongs to the 
private sphere.  
 
For the time being I will not offer a philosophically rigorous definition of privacy. As a 
rough and ready working understanding of privacy, it can be said that the private, in 
the sense of privacy, refers to that which is typically kept hidden by an individual from 
most other people in a certain society. I will mostly rely on paradigmatic privacy cases 
to argue that, whatever definition of privacy we favour, and as long as we want it to 
roughly accord with common usage, we cannot rely on the private/public distinction 
as it is commonly understood in order to justify a claim about what ought to be kept 
private.2 
 
The private as a physical space 
 
One commonsensical way to divide the private and the public is to suppose that the 
private sphere is a spatial zone intimately related to individuals and families that is off-
limits, or of no concern, to the government or to other citizens. That it is of no 
concern to others is meant normatively, not descriptively. A neighbour might be very 
interested in what you look like without your clothes on behind the shut curtains of 
your bedroom, but he should not be (or, at the very least, he should not have access to 
your bedroom). The paradigmatic locus of the private in this sense is the home.  
 
By contrast, the public sphere is a shared zone that is the legitimate concern of both 
the government and the people, the citizenry in general. The public sphere is an area 
that is subject to the authority of the government. Paradigmatic public places are 
streets, public squares, parks, and government buildings. 
 
One might think, then, that under this division, people can expect privacy in the 
guarded comfort of their houses (as long as they do not engage in criminal activities). 
In the streets, however, privacy is not to be expected or respected. Thus, there are 
those who think that even if photographers do not have the right to take shots of 
people who are in their homes, as soon as people step out of their houses, it is fair 
game to capture them with a lens. Photographer Nick Turpin, for example, believes 
that ‘what happens in a public place should be a matter of public record’ (Laurent 
2013). Turpin acknowledges taking photographs may have bad consequences. ‘I could 
be photographing a couple kissing while they shouldn’t be kissing. But if they are 
doing it in a public space, it’s a risk that they’re running…’ he said.  
 
Nick Turpin’s example seems to provide strong support for his position because 
kissing on the street appears to be a particularly voluntary act, but not all behaviours 
seem so deliberate. Consider the case of an individual getting hit by a car on the 
street. When the paramedics arrive, they cut through his clothes in order to give him 
medical treatment. In this case it is much less clear that witnesses are entitled to take 
photographs of him naked and injured—much less publish them. The fact that he did 
not intend to be unclothed in public and the sensitive nature of the situation are 
reasons for people to act with discretion. Cases such as these are enough to show that 
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Turpin is wrong, that people can have a claim that others respect their privacy when 
being in a public space—at least in certain circumstances. 
 
Even in cases in which it seems that people have deliberately chosen to carry out a 
sensitive act such as kissing in public, it is worth noting that often our ‘choices’ are 
much more constrained than they seem. A couple may not have the financial means 
to live in places where they can enjoy privacy or to pay for a hotel room. A political 
dissenter may not be able to meet with a fellow activist in her home because she 
suspects her house is under surveillance. Sometimes, the only breaths of privacy we 
can get are precisely in public spaces, away from people who can recognise us. 
 
In this vein, Patricia Meyer Spacks notes how women often find privacy only outside 
of the home: “the housewife wants privacy specifically to get away from her family for 
a time” (2003, 1). The home is thought to provide a temporary relief from the 
demands of the larger society. At home, one can stay in one’s nightgown, put one’s 
feet on the table, and relax. Sometimes, however, domestic chores and family 
obligations can get in the way of one’s individual privacy. Having to engage with 
family can be an obstacle to having the chance to spend time by oneself writing in 
one’s diary, for example, speak privately with a friend, away from the eyes and ears of 
one’s spouse and children. With the passage of time, intimacy can become a burden, 
and caring can become oppressive (Moore 1984, 277, 42). If the house is too small, 
noises from others’ activities can be annoying. An escape from others is important for 
wellbeing. Men, women, children, and teenagers all get privacy from their families by 
leaving their house for some hours every day and entering the public sphere. School, 
work, and solitary walks (even if they take place in crowded streets) can all serve as 
potential privacy resources.  
 
These cases show that sometimes privacy sides with the public in the private/public 
divide. Above and beyond these counterexamples, there is an equally important limit 
to be noted with respect to the public and the private as normative spatial zones. One 
problem with separating the private and the public on the basis of that which is the 
legitimate concern of individuals and families or the government and the citizenry is 
that it is a normatively laden demarcation. Such a characterisation could not explain 
why something should be protected by privacy; it would be question-begging. In other 
words, it is not enough to say “x should be protected by privacy because x is part of 
the private domain.” One would have to then justify why x is off-limits or not a 
legitimate concern of the government or the public.  
 
The private as that which is not publicly funded 
 
Another common way of drawing a line between the private and the public is by 
appealing to the sources of funding. If an institution or a space is funded with money 
earned by businesses or individuals acting in a non-governmental capacity, it is usually 
thought to belong to the private sector. According to this way of dividing the pie, 
individual citizens fall into the private domain on account of their wages, estates, and 
shares being personal assets. If an institution or a space is funded with money coming 
from taxpayers, it is usually listed as belonging to the public sector. On this view, 
streets would be considered public because they are built with government funds. 
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One may think that privacy has nothing to do with what is publicly or privately 
funded, but it is plausible to think that paying for something (even if only partially) 
earns you certain kinds of entitlements. Thus, one might think that just as employers 
are entitled to some degree of knowledge about their employees (at least while the 
latter are on duty), so citizens are entitled to keep an eye on their public officials 
because they are paying for their salaries by way of their taxes. In the same vein, it is 
plausible to think that people are entitled to use the streets as they wish—e.g. taking 
photographs of others or engaging in other privacy invading practices—because the 
streets are theirs, since they pay for them through their taxes.3 
 
The first thing to point out is that financially separating the private and the public is 
problematic. When it comes to spaces, there are some public squares that are 
privately owned (e.g. Zuccotti Park, in New York City, where the Occupy Wall Street 
camp was placed), and some spaces that are publicly funded but used privately (e.g. 
public housing). 
 
Even if we could sharply distinguish between the private from the public on account 
of funding, marking the divide by focusing on the origin of money will not help us in 
deciding what ought to be kept private. It is clear that whether spaces are publicly or 
privately funded is no good guide for whether people should enjoy privacy when using 
them. Patients are entitled to high degrees of privacy regardless of whether they are 
treated in a public or a private hospital, for example. Likewise, people should be able 
to enjoy privacy in their bedrooms even if they are staying for free at a house owned 
by the government. 
 
The implication of these counterexamples is that what was true of the spatial 
delimitation between the private and the public is also true of a financial delimitation: 
privacy cannot be descriptively specified or normatively decided by reference to what 
is private in a financial sense. The implication for privacy in the streets is that the fact 
that streets belong to the public sphere on account of them being built with 
government funds cannot justify not being able to enjoy privacy while making use of 
them. 
 
If appealing to the public and private distinction is unhelpful, how can we know what 
privacy is and what degree of privacy should we expect while on the street? In what 
follows I offer an account of privacy that helps determine when and where privacy 
ought to be respected.  
 
Privacy and its value  
 
Let us take a situation in which Tom peeps through Dana’s bedroom window as a 
paradigmatic example of a loss of privacy. Precisely because privacy in public spaces is 
a contested issue, it is better to take as a paradigm case one for which most people 																																																								3	Note that this kind of argument could be reversed as a point against government 
surveillance. Since it is the people who pay and own their streets, they should be able 
to enjoy the streets as they wish—and they might wish to make use of them without 
the discomfort of being watched by surveillance cameras. This argument, however, is 
just as unsuccessful for, as we will continue to see, the source of funding cannot justify 
whether something ought to be protected by privacy.  
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would have no objections in seeing it as a privacy invasion in order to come up with a 
definition of privacy which can then by applied to public spaces. The peeping Tom 
paradigm encapsulates many lessons about privacy.  
 
One of those lessons is that privacy is not only about information. Dana might worry 
that Tom may gather sensitive information from watching her bedroom (e.g. who she 
sleeps with). But suppose Dana is simply reading the newspaper in her bedroom and 
she is not worried about the (trivial) information Tom can glean by spying on her 
through the window. Dana might still be upset about Tom peeping through her 
window, even when she is not concerned about the information Tom is learning.  
 
The unease experienced when someone looks at you when you do not want to be 
looked at that does not seem to be captured by describing it in terms of the 
information others may acquire about you. Indeed, if Dana were to realise that Tom 
is looking through her window (and supposing there is nothing she can do to make 
him go away), she might be so disturbed that she might find she can no longer 
concentrate on her reading. What matters, then, is not only information, but also 
sensorial access. We care about others being able to see us, hear us, touch us, smell us.  
 
Another valuable lesson is that culture and social norms matter. In our societies, the 
bedroom is a culturally designated area of privacy—an area where it is generally 
recognised that individuals have a particularly strong claim to privacy.  
 
The home and the bedroom are paradigm cases of private spaces, but I contend that 
social norms are such that we implicitly do and should acknowledge a kind of bubble 
of personal space that surrounds us. The bubble expands or shrinks depending on the 
social conventions accorded to different places and situations. I call this bubble the 
autotopos. 4  Autotopos, then, refers to a metaphorical sensorial personal space, a 
sensorial self-space. It is the kind of sensorial space that people in a society commonly 
would not want anyone, other than him/herself (and perhaps a very limited number 
of other people chosen by him/her), to access.  
 
There are two ways our autotopos can be accessed. First, when someone sensorially 
enters a culturally established personal zone of ours. That is, when someone (through 
direct or indirect perception such as cameras and microphones) sees, hears, smells, or 
touches us in a zone where there are cultural expectations to be free from the eyes, 
ears, touch, and presence of others (e.g. in the toilet). Second, our autotopos is 
accessed when we are witnessed engaging in some activity or being the subject of 
some event that typically evokes the desire to have no witnesses or very few chosen 
witnesses (e.g. being naked). Such an activity or event may happen in the public 
sphere, as in the case in which paramedics strip a person who has suffered an accident 
in order to offer them medical attention while on the street. The fact that someone is 
in a public space should not give others the impression that they can invade her 
privacy if she is in a sensitive situation.  
 
The autotopos is metaphorical because it does not precisely equate with physical or 
territorial space, even if the two might overlap. It is a sensorial bubble. Placing a 
camera outside of your bedroom window may not invade a physical space, but it does 																																																								
4	My thanks to Roger Crisp for suggesting this term. 
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invade a sensorial space. Placing a foot on a land that you have never visited and yet 
own halfway across the world may be an invasion of private property, but not of your 
privacy. For privacy, what matters is that one can be seen, heard, smelled, and 
touched by others.  
 
It can be said, then, that Dana possesses privacy with respect to Tom if both her 
autotopos and her personal information remain unaccessed by Tom. 
 
By personal information I mean the kind of information that is common for people in 
a certain society not to want anyone, other than him/herself (and perhaps a very 
limited number of other people chosen by him/her), to know about. Personal 
information also includes information that someone is particularly sensitive about and 
has taken measures to conceal from others.  
 
According to this account, Tom accesses Dana’s personal information the moment 
Tom gains knowledge of it. In other words, it is not enough for the information to be 
accessible to Tom. If Tom finds Dana’s diary but does not read it—as long as the 
diary remains unaccessed—Dana has lost no privacy.5 
 
One might wonder what makes the two species—informational and sensorial access—
part of the genus of privacy. The unity of the category of privacy is founded on the 
notion of being personally unaccessed and the kinds of interests we have in not being 
accessed by others. Privacy protects us from a) certain kinds of harms that may come 
about as a result of other people having access to our personal life, b) the demands of 
sociality, c) being judged and possibly ridiculed by others (and thus from self-conscious 
negative emotions such as shame and embarrassment), and d) the discomfort of being 
watched, heard, and so on. Privacy is valuable because we value the interests it 
protects. 
 
Through such protection, privacy enables individuals to present themselves in 
different ways to different people (Marmor 2015). In his book, The Presentation of the Self 
in Everyday Life (1959), sociologist Erving Goffman described how this control was 
crucial for successfully managing both professional and personal relationships. 
Similarly, James Rachels (1975) has pointed out that being able to control who has 
access to oneself and information about one is intimately related to our ability to 
maintain different kinds of relationships.  
 
It could be objected that we should not be given the chance to act differently in the 
presence of different people because that amounts to being two-faced, dishonest, or 
inauthentic. On this view, a lack of privacy would implement absolute transparency 
and that would be good, because it would force people to show their true colours to 
everyone alike, or so the thought goes. As Rachels has argued, however, different 
relationships are partly defined by different patterns of behaviour. One’s best friend 																																																								
5 The adjective “unaccessed” is not found in any dictionary, but there is no suitable 
existing term to convey in one word the property of not having been accessed. 
“Inaccessible” denotes the property of not being able to be accessed, which is different 
from being accessible yet not actually accessed. Analogous differentiations exist in 
English, however, that use the same prefixes (e.g. indisputable/undisputed, 
inalterable/unaltered, etc.). 
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would not be one’s best friend if one could not cry, swear, and express one’s fears in 
her presence. If one were to display the same kind of behaviour with, say, one’s 
students, one would be acting inappropriately. It is not that one is being dishonest 
when one acts with one’s student differently than when one is the company of friends. 
Rather, relationships function as a kind of division of labour, and loading one kind of 
relationship with the burdens of another type of relationship creates confusion and 
dissatisfaction.  
 
Furthermore, as Thomas Nagel (1998) has pointed out, these patterns of behaviour 
are not dishonest because they are not meant to deceive; they are social conventions 
that are typically shared and well known by all. Being able to conceal certain aspects 
of ourselves in order to present ourselves in appropriate ways depending on the public 
we are facing “protects one from the sense of exposure without having to be in any 
way dishonest or deceptive, just as clothing does not conceal the fact that one is naked 
underneath” (Nagel 1998). 
 
The more privacy we can have in the streets, the more we will be spared from 
unwanted gossip, and the more possibilities we will enjoy of presenting ourselves in 
different ways. Privacy in the streets is important for people who cannot be themselves 
elsewhere. It is valuable because it allows people to explore things, places, and people 
that they would otherwise would not explore because of outside influences, for fear of 
what others might think of them, or for fear of repercussions.  
 
In the streets, privacy keeps us safe from various harms. The more personal 
information others know about us, the more likely it is that it will be used against us in 
unfair ways. Criminals can use information about us, such as where we live, to 
commit identity theft, for instance, and businesses can use that information to create 
personalised pricing, in which some people pay more than others depending on where 
they live.  
 
Enjoying privacy in the streets also enables us to have time and space for our 
thoughts. Walking in the midst of a crowded street in which no one pays attention to 
us and where we do not have to spend energy attending to others can be a respite 
from the burdens of social interaction (Gavison 1980).  
 
In the political realm, privacy contributes to the protection of liberal, democratic, and 
pluralistic societies (Gavison 1980). Privacy fosters and encourages individuals’ 
autonomy by shielding them from external interference. Political liberty requires that 
people have the right to keep private their votes, associations, and thoughts, if they so 
wish. When democracies corrode and disagreeing with power becomes dangerous, 
privacy protects political dissenters such as activists and whistleblowers. When 
advocating against injustice may endanger one’s life or one’s loved ones, having the 
possibility of anonymous protest and resistance becomes crucial to defend democratic 
ideals. 
 
With the right social norms and laws in place, streets can be rich privacy resources 
where individuals can take refuge to explore the world around them, to be alone with 
their thoughts or in the company they choose, to be anonymous, to be themselves, to 
be safe surrounded by strangers, to protest for just causes. If we let privacy die in 
public places, on the other hand, the streets can become inhospitable places where 
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passers-by, through venturing out of their homes, risk stress, crime, loss of their 
reputation, and more.  
 
Rural public places are outside the scope of this chapter. I focus on city streets because 
already, most of the world’s population is urban, and this trend is on the increase, 
with some experts estimating that by 2210, nearly 87% of people will be living in cities 
(Fuller and Romer 2014). Furthermore, protecting privacy is much more of an issue in 
cities, and increasingly so. In rural areas, privacy challenges are much the same as 
they have been for hundreds of years, with some exceptions provided by technologies 
such as smartphone cameras and drones (which also affect cities). The scope for action 
in modifying privacy risks in rural areas is more limited, constrained by defining 
features of geography and density of population. When it comes to cities, in contrast, 
it is widely up to society how to fashion streets and technology to accord with our 
privacy desires. The city is utterly suffused with technological artefacts that put 
privacy at risk: from CCTVs to smartphone cameras, drones, electronic cards, smart 
meters, and more.  
 
Numerous cities around the world are becoming “smart,” one step at a time. 
Santander, Amsterdam, Barcelona, and Dublin have all launched projects to further 
digitise urban experience. The most radical and ambitious project is currently being 
undertaken by Google’s Sidewalk Labs in Toronto. Their objective is to transform 
800 acres of waterfront property into the most technological urban area the world has 
thus far seen (Badger 2017). With smarter cities, innumerable privacy challenges are 
coming our way. The better we understand the value of privacy in our streets, the 
better prepared we will be to face those challenges. 
  
 
Privacy in the streets 
 
Imagine being barred from stepping onto the streets. Consider a city life constrained 
to spending it indoors, and in privately owned open spaces such as gardens. Other 
things being equal, it seems that this would be an impoverished life. It is better to be 
able to go out into the street than not to have that possibility. In other words, we gain 
in cultural richness, valuable opportunities, and pleasurable experiences by being able 
to enjoy the streets of our cities. Streets provide us with the possibility of breathing 
fresh air, meeting both friends and strangers who may become friends, enjoying 
outdoor cultural events such as street music and theatre, participating in the cultural 
milieu of our city by appreciating trends related to fashion, architecture, etc. They 
enable easy access to shops and they allow pedestrians to discover and enjoy new 
places and people. 
 
Furthermore, except for people who are wealthy enough to pay others to do some 
tasks, going out into the street is usually not optional. It is not only that streets are full 
of wondrous possibilities; using them is necessary for the livelihoods of most people. 
One can hardly avoid streets if one needs to go to work, get groceries, or enjoy some 
much needed human contact. 
 
Because of their ubiquity and their ability to connect parts of the city, streets are one 
of the most fundamental commons experienced in an urban context. Streets are the 
veins of a city, and citizens are the oxygen that runs through them, making the 
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metropolis live and breathe. However, there are certain preconditions necessary for 
citizens to be able to fully enjoy their streets. Streets must be reasonably safe. If people 
are afraid for their physical integrity when walking down avenues and roads, they will 
likely restrict their movements, the places they visit, and the times they go out at, thus 
not being able to fully enjoy the commons. Likewise, if streets are not clean enough, or 
if they are not accessible enough (for the handicapped, the elderly, for parents with 
pushchairs), people are more likely to avoid them. In a similar vein, if people cannot 
enjoy some degree of privacy on the streets, if they are constantly exposed to 
invasions, they are likely to go out less than they otherwise would, or to alter their 
habits in protective ways that are detrimental to their enjoyment of the streets. For 
people to feel safe, both their personal information and their autotopos have to enjoy 
a reasonable degree of respect. 
 
The documentary $ellebrity (Mazur 2012) illustrates how traumatic a lack of privacy 
can be in public spaces. It tells the story of celebrities reduced to tears and anxiety 
because they cannot take a step outside their homes without having paparazzi harass 
them with questions and pictures. The lack of privacy can be so unnerving that it can 
drive people to take unnecessary risks: although it is a matter of controversy, for years 
it has been suggested that Princess Diana’s death in a car crash may have been caused 
by her chauffer trying to escape paparazzi. The issue of what degree of privacy should 
celebrities enjoy in public spaces is complex and beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Most people will presumably agree, however, that whether it is the right price to pay 
or not for fame, the inability to be anonymous in the street is a serious loss, and 
ordinary people, however we may want to define them, should not have to suffer such 
loss. 
 
Of course there is a certain vulnerability inherent to stepping onto the sidewalk. It is 
unreasonable to expect complete privacy on the streets. Leaving the enclosed space of 
the home necessarily exposes us to a myriad of people, with all the risks that involves. 
By going out of our homes we run both physical risks, such as getting hurt by cars or 
other pedestrians, and privacy risks (e.g. others may notice us when we would prefer 
not to be noticed). Our autotopos is bound to be at risk by others looking at us, and so 
is our personal information, as at least some passers-by or neighbours are bound to 
notice where we live as we go out of our homes. 
 
An important distinction should thus be made between inevitable kinds of exposure 
and unnecessary invasions of privacy. Inevitable exposure comes from the need to 
make the streets available to the enjoyment of all. Other things being equal, people 
cannot be banned from walking down any particular street without seriously impeding 
their enjoyment of public spaces, and likewise it cannot be forbidden to look at other 
people who are on the street. There is thus an unavoidable risk that one may bump 
into people one would wish to not to see or not to be seen by. As Goffman points out, 
public spaces render “persons uniquely accessible, available, and subject to one 
another. Public order, in its face-to-face aspects, has to do with the normative 
regulation of this accessibility” (1963, 22). In cases of unavoidable exposure, social 
norms can go a long way towards minimising negative consequences. We tend to 
practise decorum in cases in which we perceive we might be invading someone’s 
privacy.  
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People ‘divulge information’ about themselves, often against their wishes, by their 
‘mere presence in a situation’ (Goffman 1963, 103). Imagine seeing a work 
acquaintance walking down the street. He is holding someone’s hand. As soon as he 
notices you, he blushes, lets go of his companion’s hand, and faces a shop window, 
pretending not to have seen you, giving his back to you as you pass by. People 
wanting to control others’ access to them typically avert their eyes to avoid eye contact 
(Goffman 1963, 93). The tactful approach to this situation—given that your 
acquaintance clearly does not want to interact with you—is not to force an encounter, 
join him in pretending you did not see each other, walk by, and not talk about the 
incident with others.  
 
As has been mentioned, context is partly what modulates the boundaries of people’s 
autotopos. Helen Nissenbaum’s framework of contextual integrity helps explain the 
importance of different situations for privacy. According to her, what is most 
important to people is not simply limiting access to personal information, but rather 
ensuring that information flows appropriately. Context is what determines that 
appropriateness (Nissenbaum 2010, 1-4). As Nissenbaum explains, ‘[c]ontexts are 
structured social settings characterized by canonical activities, roles, relationships, 
power structures, norms (or rules), and internal values (goals, ends, purposes)’ (2010, 
132). Social norms regulating behaviour on the streets are thus influenced by culture 
and by nuances in the situation (e.g. whether the person we encounter is 
accompanied, whether she may feel embarrassed about the way she is dressed or the 
store she is visiting, etc.).  
 
It may not always be easy to know how much privacy someone wants if one happens 
upon her on the street. Social cues such as avoiding eye contact help in 
communicating privacy needs; they are clues as to whether someone needs space from 
us, whether their autotopos needs to be respected at a certain time and place. As Irwin 
Altman puts it, “[p]eople implement desired levels of privacy by behavioural 
mechanisms such as verbal and paraverbal behavior, nonverbal use of the body, 
environmental behaviors and cultural norms and customs” (1976, 17). 
 
Social norms that minimise inevitable exposure include not watching intently at 
people, and not following them around. In other words, social decorum in public 
places demands of people that they interact in an “unfocused” way. For example, that 
they manage copresence on the streets by quickly glancing at others, rather than 
staring (Goffman 1963, 24). There is a kind of courtesy involved in giving a passer-by 
“enough visual notice” to acknowledge his presence “while at the next moment 
withdrawing one’s attention from him so as to express that he does not constitute a 
target of special curiosity.” Goffman calls it “civil inattention,” a kind of “dimming of 
lights” when persons pass each other on the streets (1963, 84).  
 
In short: in the streets we are accessible, but what matters the most is that we are not 
accessed in ways that make us uncomfortable. Because we are accessible, a healthy 
and full use of the streets depends on trusting that others will not access us 
inappropriately, even when they could. 
 
Avoidable invasions of privacy violate the respect for others’ personal information and 
autotopos. They are practices that are not necessary for all to enjoy the streets and 
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that diminish the privacy of individuals. Avoidable invasions of privacy may come 
from other individuals, businesses, and governments.  
 
Other passers-by can invade our privacy by taking photographs of us and publishing 
them. When photographs are taken surreptitiously, there is always a risk of the target’s 
autotopos being invaded, as the photographer usually does not have enough 
information to know whether the target might be in a certain context where she does 
not wish to be photographed (e.g. perhaps she does not want people to know she was 
where she was). The invasion can be especially damaging if the photograph portrays 
what is clearly a sensitive situation, such as the victim of an accident or some other 
kind of disaster, or a couple kissing. Photographs can be especially harmful because 
they can involve both a breach of people’s autotopos (which can lead to people feeling 
embarrassed from their image being exposed, above and beyond issues of 
information) and they can also disclose very personal information (e.g. a romantic 
relationship). The popularisation of smartphones has made photographing in the 
streets a much more common practice. Social media sites like Facebook have made it 
easier to publish pictures to a wide audience without always knowing whether it might 
have bad consequences for someone. Wearable cameras such as Google Glass or 
MeCam represent further threats to privacy. 
 
Businesses can invade our privacy by using facial recognition systems and by 
identifying people through their smartphones and following their every step when they 
enter a shop (Clifford and Hardy 2013). Shops are using the Wi-Fi signals from 
mobiles to fish for personal information about shoppers and to track their buying 
behaviours,6 and they use cameras and facial recognition to assess people’s moods, 
among other things. Commercial invasions of privacy are mostly about personal 
information, even when they use people’s autotopos (as in the case of facial 
recognition) to get to the former. This information is then used for marketing 
purposes, but it also gets sold to data brokers (Hoofnagle 2016). Data brokers then sell 
profiles to the highest bidder; they have been known to sell lists of rape victims, AIDS 
patients, and more (Hicken 2013).  
 
Finally, governments can invade our privacy through the use of technology. The most 
obvious example are CCTV cameras. It can be argued that surveillance cameras 
should be considered as an inevitable kind of invasion because they ensure safety and 
are thus necessary for streets to be enjoyed by everyone. However, evidence regarding 
the effectiveness of cameras at deterring crime is contradictory, with a significant 
amount of it suggesting no effect whatsoever (Cameron et al. 2008). Other evidence 
suggests that they are only as effective and streetlights (Welsh and Farrington 2004), 
yet much more privacy-invading. In any case, even if we agree on their necessity, 
there are ways in which they can be abused: by keeping footage for longer than 
necessary, by tracking individuals without reasonable suspicion, by selling that 
footage, or by irresponsibly publishing images. In 1995, for example, a CCTV camera 
caught a man about to slash his wrists. The footage was then shown to more than 9 
million viewers on a BBC show without concealing his face (Dyer 2003). 
 
																																																								
6 To minimise others’ ability to track one, it is advisable to turn off the Wi-Fi on one’s 
smartphone when leaving one’s home. 
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A less well-known technology through which governments invade citizens’ privacy are 
IMSI-catchers—fake cell phone towers that trick mobile phones into connecting to 
them. Once connected, IMSI-catchers can collect identification and location data, as 
well as enable eavesdropping on phone conversations, text messages, and web 
browsing (Hicken 2013). There is evidence that this equipment is being used by the 
police across London to spy on people, for example, at peaceful protests and near the 
UK parliament (Bryant 2016).  
 
Popular advice given online to protect one’s privacy now includes leaving one’s phone 
at home when going to a protest (Dunne 2017). Phones guard some of the most 
personal information people hold about themselves, and protestors are not keen on 
the police having information on them that could potentially be used against them. 
However, not having a phone during a protest is a significant difficulty. Having a 
phone is important for protestors to feel safe. Protests can get out of control, and 
friends and loved ones often get separated, sometimes simply as a result of the amount 
of people protesting, and sometimes as a result of police intervention or violent 
disruptions of various kinds. Having a phone allows people to be in touch, reorganise, 
and find each other. Having a phone also means that one is able to call for help in 
case of injury or arrest. Sometimes activists are forced to stay more time in police 
custody than necessary because they could not alert their loved ones or their lawyer 
that they had been arrested. Finally, having smartphones allows for the possibility of 
filming police wrongdoing. People having to leave smartphones at home, or worse, 
not going to protests for fear of invasive practices by the police, are not good signs of 
healthy democracies. 
 
With all of these avoidable invasions of privacy, social norms such as decorum are not 
enough to guarantee privacy—appropriate laws must be passed. It may be argued 
that laws are not necessary because most of these privacy invasions do not threaten 
the use of the streets, as people do not seem to care about them, or not enough to stop 
them from stepping onto the sidewalk. There are at least three responses to this 
objection.  
 
First, people may be unaware of many of the privacy invasions they are being victims 
to. By deceiving victims of privacy invasions, privacy offenders are failing to respect 
people’s autonomy. Covert surveillance deceives victims about their world—it 
controls the victim’s beliefs about whether she is being watched (Benn 1971). These 
false beliefs affect the victim’s desires and her actions. She acts differently than she 
would if she knew she was being watched. Through deception, watchers thwart 
citizens’ attempts to make rational choices for themselves. For people to be able to 
autonomously decide how to lead their lives, they must be reasonably well-informed 
about whether someone is watching them, among other things (Benn 1971).  
 
Second, people may not have a choice but to go out onto the street in order to lead 
their lives. Their continued use of the streets may not be taken as consent or 
agreement. People may feel so impotent in the face of so many privacy threats that 
they may resign themselves to the status quo. It is impossible to protect oneself from 
all the privacy invasions that take place regularly on our streets, and resigning oneself 
to this fact is not the same as not minding or not having a strong preference for 
privacy. Furthermore, the discomfort of not enjoying privacy might still be influencing 
people’s behaviour for the worse, even if it does not go so far as to make people not go 
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out at all. It is hard to tell whether people might be expressing less affection in public, 
for example, because they feel more watched than in the past, or whether they might 
be avoiding certain places that they would not avoid were they to enjoy more privacy. 
 
Third, even if people are informed of the privacy invasion they are subject to and they 
still do not mind them, there is still reason to think that there is a moral wrong 
happening, that the street as a commons is being damaged. It is possible that privacy 
damages are similar to ecological damages in that they are often noticed when it is too 
late. Individual and small acts of littering or polluting do not seem to make a 
difference. Yet acts of littering and polluting accumulate, and there comes a moment 
when the damage is noticeable, great, and often irreversible. Similarly, every bit of 
personal data that we give away or that gets invaded seems irrelevant: it does not hurt 
and people may not notice it. But as we lose more and more privacy, as more 
information about us becomes unprotected, we become more and more vulnerable to 
harms, and the likelihood and number of privacy harms is bound to go up. We can 
already appreciate this trend. According to the Federal Trade Commission (2016), for 
example, identity theft complaints in the United States increased by 47% between 
2014 and 2015. 
 
There is a further question about what kinds privacy invasions should generate legal 
liability. 7  Minor privacy invasions such as stares should clearly not be legally 
regulated, unless we want to build a police state that would, ironically, only erode 
privacy further. The issue merits a chapter on its own and is beyond the scope of this 
one, but some observations are in order. 
 
Although respecting other people’s privacy includes respecting information they are 
sensitive about, it is not appropriate for the law to legislate according to individual 
sensitivities. If you know someone is sensitive about something seemingly irrelevant 
such as their height, the virtuous thing to do is not to try to find out how tall they are. 
However, the law should not punish such privacy invasions, as people can be sensitive 
about too many things, some of them unreasonably mundane, and it is hard to 
ascertain whether they have taken steps to conceal that information, and to what 
extent gaining access to that information has been a privacy invasion. Personal 
sensitivity should be taken into account, morally, but is much too subjective to be 
legally enforced. Ordinary people would suffer too many restrictions from this kind of 
legislation. If, however, someone retrieves information that a victim is sensitive about 
through a clear privacy invasion, such as breaking and entering into her bedroom, 
then that breach should be punished—not in virtue of the kind of information 
retrieved, but in virtue of the kind of invasion used to retrieve the information 
(breaking without consent into a legally established zone of privacy). 
 
What can be legally enforced are well entrenched and generally recognised norms 
regarding privacy. The theft of personal information from mobile phones, for 
instance, should be forbidden—particularly when it comes to businesses. Businesses 
should not be able to profit from violating customers’ personal information without 
their consent, and personal information should never be used against the interests of 
customers (e.g. by driving prices up depending on where a person lives, or what she 
does for a living).  																																																								
7 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this issue. 
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Legal regulation should be heavier on the side of businesses than individuals, and it 
should always be in the service of citizens’ wellbeing. Being able to enjoy the streets 
without fear of undue exposure is an important component of the wellbeing of 
populations. Through social norms and laws, access must be as limited as possible 
(without encroaching on others’ claim to enjoy public spaces) to both personal 
information and people’s autotopos while they enjoy the streets. As things stand, there 
is much room for improvement. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have argued that the public nature of streets does not justify a radical 
lack of privacy. Both political philosophy and morality are in the business of figuring 
out what a better world would look like. I have argued that a world in which we can 
enjoy more privacy in the streets would be a better one.  
 
We may go on eroding privacy in the streets and may not notice all of its effects 
immediately. At the moment, only some people are bearing the brunt: the unlucky 
ones who suffer identity theft, the ones who live in dangerous countries and risk 
getting kidnapped, LGBT people living in intolerant societies, people engaging in 
forbidden love, and so on. The risk is that, when those effects reach most of us, when 
we are all made to suffer grave consequences from lack of privacy, privacy invading 
customs and practices may be so entrenched in our culture, economy, and laws, that it 
may be very difficult to go back to a more private world.  
 
Once privacy in the streets is lost, only the very rich will be able to secure it. Only 
people who can afford to pay for other people to go out into the streets to take care of 
everyday chores for them, and for properties that can offer them privacy, will be able 
to fully enjoy the many benefits of privacy. The Guardian recently reported that, for the 
first time, this generation will be poorer than its parents (Barr and Malik 2016). In a 
historical moment in which housing prices seem to be soaring in much of the world, in 
which a significant proportion of young professionals are either forced to live with 
their parents or to share a flat with others, being able to enjoy privacy in the streets 
becomes all the more important. Better to decide what kind of streets we want now, 
while we are still in time to shape social norms and laws to be more respectful of 
privacy, than to wait until we feel the full force of a lack of privacy—the damages may 
be severe, and it may be too late to turn back. 
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